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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE LIMITATIONS
ON PEACEFUL PICKETING
HE decisions in Thornhill v. Alabama' and Carlson v. Califor-
nia' went a long way in removing industrial picketing beyond
the control of the police power of a state. To what extent the doc-
trine announced by those two cases immunized peaceful picketing
from injunction has been a "storm center of constitutional law"
during the past ten years.
In the Thornhill and Carlson cases the Supreme Court of the
United States declared the publication of the facts of a labor dis-
pute near an employer's place of business, whether by sign,
pamphlet, or word of mouth, to be an exercise of the right of free
speech protected from abridgment by a state by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Accordingly, a state or municipal enactment forbidding all picket-
ing was unconstitutional. The language of the opinions indicated
that the Court was primarily concerned with the broad prohibi-
tory scope of the statutes and were not holding that a state would
be powerless under all circumstances to control or restrict indus-
trial picketing. Mr. Justice Murphy speaking for the Court in the
Thornhill case indicated the reservation in the mind of the Court:
"Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only
where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances
affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for
acceptance in the market of public opinion....
"... No clear and present danger of destruction of life or property, or
invasion of the right of privacy, or breach of the peace can be thought
to be inherent in the activities of every person who approaches the
premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute in-
volving the latter.... [The statute] in question here does not aim spe-
cifically at serious encroachment on these interests and does not evi-
'310 U.S. 88 (1940).
310 U. S. 106 (1940i
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dence any such care in balancing these interests against the interests
of the community and that of the individual in freedom of discussion
on matters of public concern.. .. "s
Thus, the Court made it clear that it was not holding that peace-
ful picketing was speech pure and simple and immune from state
control under any and all circumstances. But under what condi-
tions and for what purpose a state could restrict peaceful picketing
without running afoul of the Constitution was not answered by the
Thornhill and Carlson cases. Nor has this question been fully clari-
fied by subsequent cases.4
In American Federation of Labor v. Swing' the Court held that
peaceful picketing does not lose its constitutional protection merely
because there is no immediate employer-employee dispute. Lack
of employer-employee relationship could not be seized upon as
an invariably sufficient cause for injunction. Such a rule was too
broad because "the interdependence of economic interest of all en-
gaged in the same industry has become a commonplace." It is to
be noted that the Swing case was one in which the peaceful picket-
ing was carried on for the closed shop.
Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl 6 spread the cloak
of constitutional protection over secondary picketing. Defendant
union, in an endeavor to induce plaintiffs (peddlers who bought
and resold bakery goods) to work but six days a week and to hire
an unemployed union member one day a week, picketed wholesale
bakeries selling to plaintiffs and grocery stores who purchased
plaintiffs' goods. Plaintiffs were independent contractors who made
deliveries in their own trucks without help. There was no employer-
employee relationship between plantiffs and the manufacturing
bakers or the grocery stores buying plaintiffs' wares. The New
York court issued an injunction against all picketing by defend-
s 310 U. S. at 104, 105.
4 The "Thornhill doctrine" has provoked numerous comments by legal scholars.
For an excellent discussion of the doctrine from "Thornhill to Angelos" see Larson,
May Peace/ul Picketing Be Enjoined? 22 Tex. L. Rev. 392 (1944).
5 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
6 315 U. S. 769 (1942).
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ant union.' The Supreme Court reversed and held that secondary
picketing was an exercise of the right of free speech protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. "One
need not be in a labor dispute, as defined by state law, to have a
right under the Fourteenth Amendment to express a grievance in a
labor matter by publication unattended by violence, coercion, or
conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive."' Weight was given to
the deep interest which defendant union had in preventing the
spread of the peddler system at the expense of union standards.
The Court remarked that it could perceive no substantive evils in
the situation of such magnitude as to warrant a holding that con-
stitutional guaranties did not operate.
In Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe9 the Court in
a 5-4 decision found peaceful picketing to be conducted under
circumstances that justified the State of Texas in issuing an injunc-
tion. Ritter had employed non-union men in the construction of a
building having no connection with his cafe. Defendant union
picketed his cafe, carrying signs informing the public that the
owner of the cafe had contracted with a non-union employer for
the construction of a building. The decision in the case did not
detract from the proposition that peaceful picketing is an exercise
of the right of free speech. But it did reject the argument that
peaceful picketing, because it is speech, must be free from restraint
wherever and however it occurs. The decision upheld the power of
a state to restrict picketing to the area of the industry within
which the labor dispute arose. The language of the opinion speaks
of reasonable regulations for the protection of the community, in-
dicating that a reasonable balancing of interests would not offend
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Ritter's Cafe case is an instance where peaceful picketing
is outside the boundaries of constitutional protection. The boun-
dary indicated is the lines of industry within which the dispute
7284 N. Y. 788, 31 N. E. 2d 765 (1940), af'g 259 App. Div. 868, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 811
(1940).
8 315 U. S. at 774.
9 315 U. S. 722 (1942), af'g 149 S. W. 2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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arose. May other boundary lines be drawn? The answer to this
question is in the affirmative, as evidenced by three decisions of
the United States Supreme Court handed down on May 8, 1950.
In Hughes v. Superior Court of California" the Court had be-
fore it this question: "Does the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution bar a State from use of the injunction to prohibit pick-
eting of a place of business solely in order to secure compliance
with a demand that its employees be in proportion to the racial
origin of its then customers?" The petitioners, acting in behalf
of a group calling itself "Progressive Citizens of America," de-
manded of Lucky Stores, Inc., that it hire Negroes at its store near
a certain housing project in Richmond, California, as white clerks
quit or were transferred, until the proportion of Negro clerks to
white clerks approximated the proportion of Negro to white custo-
mers. Lucky refused to comply with this demand, and petitioners
picketed Lucky's store to compel compliance. The superior court
granted injunction against the picketing, and when petitioners con-
tinued to picket in the face of this injunction, the court found them
guilty of contempt. On appeal the intermediate court annulled the
judgment, but the judgment was reinstated upon review by a di-
vided state supreme court." The petitioners defended their action
by attacking the injunction on the ground that it violated the right
of freedom of speech guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider this constitutional question.
The state court held that the picketing enjoined was for the at-
tainment of an unlawful objective in that it sought to compel Lucky
to discriminate in favor of one race as against all others in the
hiring of a portion of its clerks rather than to select on the basis
of merit. The declared public policy of the state was against dis-
crimination because of race, color or creed. The court found that
proportional hiring would constitute discrimination, and therefore
the objective made petitioners' acts an abuse of the right to picket.
10 70 S. Ct. 718, 719 (1950).
11 32 Cal. 2d 850. 198 P. 2d 885 (1948).
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The United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision,
affirmed the judgment of the state court. The peculiar fact situation
may make the case of doubtful value as a precedent to be fol-
lowed in the usual run of labor cases. No employer-employee dis-
pute was involved; the purpose of the picketing was not to advance
the cause of labor but to foster the special interests of a racial
group. That the court was influenced in its opinion by the conse-
quences that might flow from a contrary holding is evidenced in
the following quotation: "To deny to California the right to ban
picketing in the circumstances of this case would mean that there
could be no prohibition of the pressure of picketing to secure pro-
portional employment on ancestral grounds of Hungarians in
Cleveland, of Poles in Buffalo, of Germans in Milwaukee, of Por-
tuguese in New Bedford, of Mexicans in San Antonio, of the nu-
merous minority groups of New York, and so on through the whole
gamut of racial and religious concentrations in various cities."12
With respect to the constitutional right to picket the court was care-
ful in its expression:
"We have found that because of its element of communication picket-
ing under some circumstances finds sanction in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.... [Citing the Thornhill, Swing, Wohl and Angelos"s cases.]
However general or loose the language of opinions, the specific situa-
tions have controlled decision. It has been amply recognized that
picketing, not being the equivalent of speech as a matter of fact, is not
its inevitable legal equivalent. Picketing is not beyond the control of a
state if the manner in which picketing is conducted or the purpose
which it seeks to effectuate gives ground for its disallowance." 1'
The Court was at pains to point out that the picketing was for
an unlawful objective (to promote discrimination). There is a hint
that had the picketing been to protest existing discrimination, it
would have enjoyed constitutional protection. 5 How to determine
whether the purpose of picketing is to promote discrimination or
12 70 S. Ct. at 721.
Is 320 U. S. 293 (1943).
1470 S. Ct. at 721. Italics added.
15 Id. at 722.
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to protest existing discrimination is a problem the difficulty of
which should not be underestimated.
Building Service Union v. Gazzam6 is similar to the Hughes
case in that the picketing therein enjoined was for a purpose de-
clared to be against public policy. But here the resemblance ends.
The picketing in the Gazzam case was carried on by a labor union
to promote traditional interests of organized labor; no racial con-
flict was involved. Defendant union picketed plaintiff's business
to compel him to sign a contract that would cause him to coerce
his employees into joining defendant union. The Washington court
based its decision on the argument that picketing for a purpose
that subverted the public policy of the state was outside the scope
of constitutional protection and subject to state restraint. 7 The de-
cision was rendered by a divided court and expressly overruled
prior decisions which had made virtually all peaceful picketing
immune from injunction under the authority of the Swing case.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Washington court, citing the Angelos, Wohl, Thornhill, and Swing
cases for the proposition that picketing is in part an exercise of
the right of free speech guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
The Court went on to say: "But since picketing is more than speech
and establishes a locus in quo that has far more potential for in-
ducing action or nonaction than the message the pickets convey,
this Court has not hesitated to uphold a state's restraint of acts
and conduct which are an abuse of the right to picket rather than
a means of peaceful and truthful publicity," citing Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Hotel and Restaurant Em-
ployees, International Alliance, Local No. 222 v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relation Board, and the Ritter's Cafe case.' In answer
to petitioner's argument that the Swing case was controlling, the
Court said:
16 70 S. Ct. 784 (1950).
17 29 Wash. 2d 488, 188 P. 2d 97 (1947).
Is 70 S. Ct. at 787. In both the Meadowmoor (312 U. S. 287 (1941)) and the Hotel
and Restaurant Employees' Alliance (315 U. S. 437 (1942)) cases violence accom-
panied the picketing and was responsible for the holdings.
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"We think not. In that case this court struck down the State's re-
straint of picketing based solely on the absence of an employer-em-
ployee relationship. An adequate basis for the instant decree is the
unlawful objective of the picketing.... ,, 1
It appears that the objectives sought in the Swing and Gazzam
cases were the same, i.e., the closed shop. The two cases present a
different approach to the same question-should an employer be
protected from the consequences occasioned by picketing of his
place of business to compel him to coerce his employees to join
the picketing union? The Illinois court, in the Swing case, an-
swered this question in the affirmative and granted an injunction,
relying on the absence of an employer-employee relationship. The
Washington court answered the same question in the affirmative
but based its power to grant injunctive relief on an expressed hold-
ing that the picketing was for an unlawful purpose in that it was
an attempt to subvert the declared public policy of the state against
employer coercion of employees in their choice of a bargaining
representative. The two cases must be distinguished on the basis
that the questions presented to the Supreme Court were different.
This point of distinction is apparent in the following expression:
"Peaceful picketing for any lawful purpose is not prohibited by the
decree under review. The state has not here, as in Swing, relied on the
absence of an employer-employee relationship. Thus the state has not,
as was the case there, excluded workingmen from peacefully exercising
the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic
competition between employers and workers so small as to contain
only an employer and those directly employed by him. 20
The court further said:
"The injunction was tailored to prevent a specific violation of an
important state law. The decree was limited to the wrong being per-
petrated, namely, 'an abuse of the exercise of the right to picket.' -121
19 70 S. Ct. at 788.
20 Ibid.
21 70 S. Ct. at 789.
1950]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
The court relied on Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co.,22
saying: "Here, as in Giboney, the union was using its economic
power with that of its allies to compel respondent to abide by
union policy rather than the declared policy of the state."28
One perceives that picketing, because it is more than speech, is
subject to state prohibition if the control is directed against a situa-
tion calculated to subvert the public policy of the state. Moreover,
"to judge the wisdom of such policy" is not for the Supreme Court;
the Court "is but to determine whether a restraint of picketing in
reliance on the policy is an unwarranted encroachment upon rights
protected from state abridgement by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."24
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen, and Helpers Union, Local 309 v. Hanke et al.,"5 the
Court decided two cases favorable to the action of the State of
Washington in granting an injunction against picketing for a union
shop. The state's action26 was based on a weighing of the interests
to be protected, and the state's power to do this is upheld by the
decision. Plaintiff Hanke operated a garage and used car lot in
.Seattle. He operated his business with the aid of his three sons, em-
ploying no outside help. It was the practice of Hanke to remain
open nights, weekends, and holidays. Defendant union, which in-
cluded in its membership automobile dealers and salesmen, pick-
eted Hanke's business to compel him to operate his business in ac-
cordance with an agreement between the union and the Independent
Automobile Dealers Association of Seattle. Specifically, the union
demanded that Hanke close on weekends and on eight specified
holidays. The facts in the companion case were similar. Picketing
was carried on by an outside union to force plaintiffs to operate
according to union standards. The precise question to be decided
22 336 U. S. 490 (1949). In this case the objective of the picketing was violation
of a state anti-trust law having criminal sanction.
23 70 S. Ct. at 789.
24 Id. at 788.
25 70 S. Ct. 773 (1950).
26 207 P. 2d 206 (Wash. 1949).
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had been answered favorably to the picketing union by the Su-
preme Court in the Swing, Wohl, and Angelos cases." The Wohl
case, in particular, was a holding that seemed square authority ex-
tending constitutional protection to defendant's picketing. The
court put these cases to one side saying; "In those cases we held
only that a State could not proscribe picketing merely by setting
artificial bounds, unreal in the light of modern circumstances to
what constitutes an industrial relationship or a labor dispute."2 " If
that was the extent of the holdings in those cases, then it is a proper
point of distinction. But, as pointed out by the dissent,29 it is diffi-
cult to understand that they were so narrowly confined. Whether
the cases are in conflict or are distinguishable is a mooted ques-
tion. The significant point is the holding in the principal case. The
Court declared:
" [W] e must start with the fact that while picketing has an ingredient
of communication it cannot dogmatically be equated with the constitu-
tionally protected freedom of speech. Our decisions reflect recognition
that picketing is 'indeed a hybrid.'... The effort in the cases has been
to strike a balance between the constitutional protection of the element
of communication in picketing and 'the power of the state to set limits
of permissible contest open to industrial combatants.'. . A State's
judgment on striking such a balance is of course subject to the limita-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Embracing as such a judgment
does, however, a State's social and economic policies, which in turn
depend on knowledge and appraisal of local social and economic fac-
tors, such judgment on these matters comes to this Court bearing a
weighty title of respect."30
The court reflected on the serious problems confronting a state
in balancing public and private interests and made it clear that
the Court would not substitute its judgment for the judgment of
the state.
27 The Swing and Wohl cases are discussed supra notes 5 and 6. In the Angelos
case, cited supra note 13, defendant union picketed plaintiffs' cafe to induce plaintiffs
to hire union help. The plaintiffs had been operating without help.
28 70 S. Ct. at 778.
29 Justices Minton, Black, and Reed dissented.
80 70 S. Ct. at 775, 776.
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"Whether to prefer the union or a self-employer in such a situation,
or to seek partial recognition of both interests, and, if so, by what
means to secure such accommodation, obviously presents to a State
serious problems. There are no sure answers, and the best available
solution is likely to be experimental and tentative, and always subject
to control of the popular will. That the solution of these perplexities is
a challenge to wisdom and not a command of the Constitution is the
significance of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union. . ." ,1
This seems to be a forthright statement. Peaceful picketing has
in it an element of communication, but it is not speech pure and
simple and does not enjoy the full protection accorded to that
sacred right. A state may restrict peaceful picketing so long as in
doing so it gives due regard to the element of communication there-
in contained. All that the Constitution requires is that there be a
reasonable balancing of conflicting interests.
In concluding, a word should be said about Chapter 74 of Texas
Laws of 1947.2 This statute declares that the union or closed shop
contract is void and against public policy. Speculation has been
indulged as to the right of a union to strike and picket for the
union or closed shop in contravention of this enactment. In view
of the three United States Supreme Court cases decided this year,
there would seem to be no doubt that Texas has the constitutional
power to enjoin picketing for such a purpose.
James Lee Mitchell.
81 70 S. Ct. at 776. The Senn case is to be found in 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
82 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5207a.
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